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SEALING, JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
HON. T. S. ELLIS, III*

T

HE rule of law is the proud boast of many societies, but the hardearned achievement of far fewer. In part, this is so because the sine
qua non of the rule of law is an independentjudiciary, a delicate institution
both difficult to establish and no less difficult to sustain. Our history tells
us that judicial independence must first be constitutionally conferred and
guaranteed, and then, importantly, it must be earned and periodically redeemed by the judiciary through its actions.I In other words, judicial in* Senior United States District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia. I would be
remiss if I did not thank my law clerk, David Mader, for his assistance in the
preparation of this Article. I must also acknowledge my debt to Professor
Catherine T. Struve of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and to her
research assistant Colleen Petroni, whose research into the law and procedures
surrounding sealing was most helpful. Of course, any remaining errors are mine.
1. Because views vary on the proper scope and content of judicial independence, it may be useful to state briefly here my view on the core of this important
concept. The starting point in defining the scope and content ofjudicial independence must be Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Thus, federal judges enjoy life tenure and may
not be removed from office except by way of impeachment, trial and conviction by
the United States Senate. And importantly, judges' salaries may not be reduced
during their tenure, although judges are not saved from the ravages of inflation.
See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1048 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (explaining that
Constitution grants Congress discretion to adjust judges' salaries as economic circumstances require, and mere existence of inflation without equivalent increase in
judicial salaries did not violate Compensation Clause). Also, federal judges, unlike
continental magistrates, may not be transferred or demoted, nor may they be removed from a case or class of cases except by the judicial branch on a showing of
actual bias:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of
any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1948). And importantly, neither the Executive Branch nor the
Legislative Branch may call a judge to account for his or her decisions. Judges
receiving requests or subpoenas to do so should politely but firmly decline. See Ian
Urbina, New York's FederalJudges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2003, at BI (noting House Judiciary Committee's threat to subpoena records of
Judge James Rosenbaum and citing alleged "pattern of hostility" in his sentences).
Of course, judicial independence does not immunize ajudge from public criticism
from any quarter; such criticism is protected by the First Amendment, and the
constitutional guarantee ofjudicial independence is the armor that shields judges
from any effect of the criticism on a judge's job or tenure. This does not mean
that it is prudent for judges to refuse to consider whether any criticism might be
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dependence is required for judges to do justice, and that independence
can only survive as long as judges in fact do justice. And, as the familiar
maxim teaches, 'justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
2
and undoubtedly be seen to be done."
From this, it follows that judicial independence depends to some degree on the maintenance of judicial transparency; what judges do-the
process and product of adjudication-must be largely open to public scrutiny, else risk giving rise to a threat to judicial independence. Secret proceedings, including unwarranted or excessive sealing of court records,
engender suspicion, mistrust and a lack of confidence in the judicial process and, if not rare and well understood as necessary, such proceedings
will likely lead to attempts to limit judicial authority and independence.
Once the connection between judicial independence and judicial
transparency is recognized and understood, a related and important point
becomes clear: because judges control the sealing of judicial documents
and proceedings, they have an important role to play in enhancing the
transparency of judicial action and hence in sustaining judicial independence. By taking care-and taking steps-to ensure that sealing is (1)
minimized and (2) justified or explained on the public record, judges will
help ensure their independence qua judges. 3 This is the simple thesis of
this Article. To advance this thesis, this Article begins by briefly clarifying
the concept of transparency, and then by reviewing, equally briefly, the
legal landscape of sealing principles and requirements, offering along the
way very modest suggestions designed to enhance judicial transparency
and thereby preserve judicial independence.
I.
By judicial transparency, I simply mean the general public's ability to
monitor and examine what happens in the administration of the federal
civil and criminal justice systems. Of course, this ability to monitor and
examine extends beyond simply knowing who is or was prosecuted, for
what and with what result, or who is or was suing whom, for what and with
what result. Rather, it extends to the ability to attend and view proceedings, to examine the filed pleadings and documents and to examine the
results of the process as may be reflected in a judge's decision or opinion
valid. Also important on the issue of judicial independence is the fact that Congress retains the power to limit federal court jurisdiction, although the nature and

extent of this power is debatable. See

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

169-206 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing Congress's power to limit jurisdiction of federal
judiciary).
2. Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924).
3. Of course, transparency has beneficial effects in addition to bolsteringjudicial independence. As Professor Resnik has thoroughly and eloquently explained
at this Symposium, transparency plays an integral role in the functioning of democratic government, allowing citizens to monitor their elected (and unelected) government officials and make informed choices at the ballot box. SeeJudith Resnik,
Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REv. (2008).
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and a jury's verdict. Although this description of transparency is straightforward and uncontroversial, there is a further subtlety to the concept that
warrants description here.
Transparency is a function of both technology and public expectations, and both of these factors vary over time. This point is easily illustrated. At the time of the founding and through a substantial part of the
nineteenth century, judicial transparency meant chiefly that court proceedings were open to the public. Indeed, in many communities, courthouse proceedings were a popular, if not the sole, source of public
entertainment. Court pleadings and documents, in general, were only irregularly publicly available, but this was apparently not a major public concern, as apart from the legal community, the public seemed little
interested in court pleadings or documents. This changed toward the end
of the nineteenth century, and by the twentieth century the public had
come to expect and demand access not just to live court proceedings, but
to court pleadings and documents as well. Thus, by the time I was appointed to the federal bench in 1987, publicly acceptable judicial transparency consisted of public attendance at court proceedings and the
ability to review and copy all unsealed court pleadings and documents.
Time has since wrought further changes.
The technological revolution brought about by the advent and maturity of computers and the internet has changed what is required for adequate judicial transparency, no less than it has changed so much else in
our lives. Electronic filing and paperless docketing have transformed the
way the courts do business and the way in which the public interacts with
the courts. No longer is it necessary for a citizen to go to the clerk's office
at the courthouse to review court records; now, with a PACER account, any
individual with access to an internet connection can access and review
court documents from his or her home, office, school or public libraryor even, thanks to the recent explosion in wireless technology, an individual's local coffee shop.4 These technological advances have the potential
to facilitate judicial transparency in obvious ways, lowering the practical
costs of access to court documents for many members of the public. 5 Less
obviously, but no less importantly, these technological advances have also
stimulated a shift in the public's appetite for access to court records. As
citizens have grown accustomed to having a wealth of knowledge at their
fingertips via the internet and various search engines, their appetite (especially among academics) to consume court data in searchable, statistically
4. PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) is "an electronic public access service that allows users to obtain case and docket information from Federal Appellate, District and Bankruptcy courts." See What is Pacer?, http://pacer.
psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
5. It should be noted that those without access to the internet or PACER may
still review documents at the courthouse and may request copies of those documents, for a modest per-page fee.
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analyzable form has understandably grown. An example from a conference discussion nicely illustrates this point.
Conference participants report that academics and practitioners seek
to have access to sentencing data byjudge. This data, as a practical matter,
is not publicly available. Judgment and commitment orders setting forth
the sentence imposed in each case, the reasons in support thereof and the
related Sentencing Guidelines calculations are typically public documents
and may be individually reviewed to discover the identity of the sentencing
judge; this would be a laborious and time-consuming undertaking. As it
happens, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
Sentencing Commission have this data in a form that identifies the sentencingjudge and in a form that is searchable byjudge. Yet, by virtue of
an agreement among the Sentencing Commission, the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Administrative Office of the United
6
States Courts, this data is not publicly available.
Were this data available to academics and practitioners, academics
would be able to analyze and criticize the sentencing practices of specific
judges or districts. Moreover, practitioners would be able to argue to a
judge in a particular case that his or her past sentences were more severe
than those imposed by the judge's colleagues and that the judge should
therefore impose a less severe sentence in the case at bar in order to avoid
a prohibited unwarranted disparity. 7 Putting aside the merits of any such
argument (either in general or in a specific case), there is no persuasive
reason to conclude that such an argument never deserves to be made and
that the data should be made publicly available only in a form that effectively precludes academics and practitioners from scrutinizing and analyzing sentences imposed by specific judges.
This is just one example of the way in which changing technology
affects the public's appetite for information concerning court proceedings. This in turn changes and affects the requirements for judicial trans-

6. See

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

20 (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.us

courts.gov/judconf/marc03proc.pdf (recognizing continued applicability of
agreement); THE CHIEFJUSTICE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (1995) (justifying agreement based on "the potential for judge-specific information taken out of context to be misinterpreted");
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF

21 (1995) (same). The fact that data may be misinterpreted
and judges may be criticized is not a valid reason to withhold information. Criticism of judges, whether valid or invalid, is the very reason judges have
independence.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (2000) ("The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct .... ").
THE UNITED STATES
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parency.8 The essential transparency principle is clear: given the ease with
which the information about court proceedings and the administration of
justice can be made publicly available with new technology, and given the
public's expectations created by this ease of access, it follows that judicial
transparency today requires that (unless the law dictates otherwise) civil
and criminal court proceedings and data should be made public in a form
that does not conceal the judge's identity or otherwise hamper statistical
or other analyses. As it happens, the existing governing law on sealing
court pleadings and documents is generally consistent with this principle.
II.
The starting point in reviewing the landscape of opinion sealing is to
examine the roots of the public's constitutional and common law rights of
access to judicial proceedings. These rights properly limit a court's ability
to close judicial proceedings by sealing court records or proceedings. A
review of the history and scope of these rights is the necessary first step in
identifying the proper use and limits of sealing.
The First Amendment's right of access to judicial records is rooted in
a more general right of public access to judicial proceedings, and specifically to criminal trials.9 As the Supreme Court noted in Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court,10 the right of access to trials is based on two particular
features of the criminal justice system." First, the criminal trial has historically been open to the public-a presumption of openness that significantly predates the Constitution. 1 2 And second, public access to, and
scrutiny of, criminal trials plays a vital role in safeguarding the integrity of
the judicial process and, through it, of government as a whole.13 In particular, public access "fosters an appearance of fairness" and "permits the
4
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process."'
Together, these features create a strong presumption against the restriction of public access to court proceedings. Although the First Amendment does not compel public access to every type of proceeding, 15 the
Supreme Court has made clear that a proceeding is subject to the First
8. Although the agreement not to disclose sentencing information byjudge is
not strictly speaking a sealing decision, it is in effect the same thing because it
precludes practical review of a particular judge's sentencing decisions.
9. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-06 (1982);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1980).
10. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
11. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605.
12. See id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-69 (detailing history of

public access to criminal trials).
13. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
14. Id.

15. See Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 116 (2000 & Supp. 2003, 2005).
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Amendment right of public access if it has historically been open to the
public and if public access promotes judicial integrity.' 6
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically extended this First
Amendment right of public access to civil proceedings, 17 a number of circuit courts have done so, sensibly finding that the same considerations of
experience and logic apply equally in the civil and criminal contexts.18
When it applies, the constitutional right of public access is powerful: it
may only be denied on the basis of a compelling governmental interest,
and only when the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.19 But
it is also narrow, as it only applies to particular judicial records and documents, such as documents filed in connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in criminal trials, and documents filed in connection
20
with summary judgment motions in civil cases.
A common law right of access to court documents and records exists
that is distinct from the constitutional right.2 1 Like the First Amendment
right, this common law right is based on the importance of public oversight in maintaining judicial transparency. 22 Despite sharing a common
genesis, the common law and constitutional rights differ in important respects. The common law right is much broader; it has been held to apply
generally to alljudicial records and documents, not the subset to which
the First Amendment may apply. 2 3 Although the common law right of
access applies more broadly, it applies with less force. The common law
presumption in favor of public access can be overcome if it is merely outweighed by countervailing interests, even if those interests are not necessarily compelling, and even if the restriction on access is not narrowly
tailored to serve those interests. 24 And whereas a trial court's adjudication
of the First Amendment right is reviewed de novo on appeal, 25 application
16. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
17. But see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 ("[W]e note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.").
18. See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 13 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002);
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
19. SeePress-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); Stone
v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988).
20. See Stone, 855 F.2d at 180; Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d
249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); In reWash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986).
21. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); see also
United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995); Stone, 855 F.2d at 180.
22. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98 ("The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found, for example, in the citizen's
desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, and in a newspaper publisher's intention to publish information concerning the operation of govemnment.") (citations omitted).
23. See Stone, 855 F.2d at 180.
24. See id.; see also Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 803 (11th Cir. 1983)
(discussing courts' need to balance interests when considering public's access to
judicial records).
25. See Va. Dep't of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir.
2004).
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of the common law right is left to the trial court's discretion and reviewed
26
deferentially.
Although the constitutional and common law rights differ somewhat
in breadth and strength, they share a common process of application.
When presented with a sealing request based on either the First Amendment or the common law right of access, courts must follow certain procedures before sealing a judicial document or record; which procedures can
be found in circuit precedents 27 and court rules. 28 The precise requirements differ somewhat from circuit to circuit, but the basic process is
broadly similar: a court seeking to seal a document or proceeding must
(1) give public notice of the potential sealing and provide interested parties with an opportunity to object; (2) state the reasons for sealing on the
public record; and (3) explain why alternatives to sealing are
29
inadequate.
Of these three steps, the second is the most important-and often the
most difficult to satisfy. In this regard, courts have identified a number of
good reasons to seal court documents. For instance, documents detailing
trade secrets may appropriately be sealed, because publication would destroy the value of the secret and likely defeat the purpose of the litigation.30 Sealing is also appropriate to protect privacy interests, provided
those interests are sufficiently well-defined and outweigh the public's
rights of access. 3 1 Qualifying privacy interests likely include medical

26. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599 ("[T]he decision as to access is one best left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case."); Stone, 855 F.2d at 180.
27. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000); In re
Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Hagestad v. Tragesser,
49 F.3d 1430, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845,
848-50 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1993);
City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Greater Se.
Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 1990); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
846 F.2d 249, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area
Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 411 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 70809 (10th Cir. 1985); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071-72 (3d
Cir. 1984); Matter of Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313 & 1313 n.17 (7th
Cir. 1984); Newman, 696 F.2d at 802.
28. See, e.g., 1ST CIR. R. 11; 1ST CIR. R. 30(f); 3D CIR. R. 106.1; 4TH CIR. R.
25(c); 6TH CIR. R. 28(h); 7TH CIR. I.O.P. 10; 9TH CIR. R. 27-13; 10TH CIR. R. 11.3;
10TH CIR. R. 30.1; D.C. CIR. R. 47.1.
29. See Conoco, 218 F.3d at 302.
30. SeeJessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002); Publicke, 733 F.2d
at 1073.
31. See In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 474-76 (6th Cir. 1983)
(denying newspapers' request to unseal bank records containing customers' financial and personal information).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 6
946

VILILANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: p. 939

records,3 2 personal financial information 33 and social security information; 34 a minor's personal information also falls in this category. 3 5 In
criminal cases, sealing is often required by rule or statute. For instance,
given the long-recognized importance of secrecy in grand jury proceedings, materials relating to such proceedings are kept secret pursuant to
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 36 Similarly, matters
affecting national security must often be sealed pursuant to the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 37 or pursuant to the assertion of the
38
Executive Branch's common law privilege.
Perhaps more pertinent given the focus of this Article is a listing of
those reasons that do not justify sealing. A common, although not always
explicit, reason proffered for sealing is a party's fear of embarrassment. It
is pellucidly clear that this reason cannot justify sealing; the public's rights
of access should never be outweighed by the risk of embarrassment or
harm to reputation.3 9 Nor should a document be put under seal merely
because the parties jointly request or agree to the sealing. 40 And, of
course, it is not enough simply to cite a legitimate reason to seal documents; the party seeking the seal must establish a connection between the
document the party seeks to seal and the reason he or she gives for sealing
4
it. '

42
The case law concerning sealing procedures is fairly well-developed.
Similarly, the constitutional and common law rights of public access are
well-established, and common procedures for balancing these rights

32. See Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 137677 (8th Cir. 1990).
33. See In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 190 (1st Cir. 2003).
34. See Earle v. Aramark Corp., 247 F. App'x 519, 525-26 (5th Cir. 2007).
35. SeeJessup, 277 F.3d at 928.
36. See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218-19
(1979); Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 290-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United
States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1988).
37. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. 2003, 2005). For a description of
the application of CIPA in a specific context, see United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp.
2d 786, 790 (E.D. Va. 2007). CIPA represents a Congressional determination that
the government's interest in secrecy for certain matters outweighs the public's
right of access.
38. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); see also Rosen, 520 F.
Supp. 2d at 809 (discussing application of Reynolds privilege).
39. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th
Cir. 1983) ("Simply showing that the information would harm the company's reputation is not sufficient to overcome the strong common law presumption in favor
of public access to court proceedings and records.").
40. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002)
("Despite these principles, the parties' joint motion made no effort to justify the
claim of secrecy. It was simply asserted, mostly on the basis of the agreement ....
That won't do.").
41. See Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Simply mentioning a general category of privilege, without any further elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents, does not satisfy the burden.").
42. For a further discussion of the case law, see supra note 27.
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against the occasional need for secrecy or discretion have been widely
adopted. 43 In essence, there is widespread agreement among the courts
regarding the sorts of interests that may outweigh the public's right of
access. Given this legal landscape, it is appropriate now to consider what
further steps might be taken to ensure that sealing is minimized, transparency maximized and judicial independence thereby enhanced.
III.
1. To begin with, no case, whether civil or criminal, should be litigated entirely under seal. This point is well established in our jurisprudence, and in English jurisprudence before the American Revolution. As
Justice Black wrote in In re Oliver,
Counsel have not cited and we have been unable to find a single
instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal,
state, or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor
have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial
in England since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641
44

The same should hold true in civil trials. My imagination is no doubt poverty-stricken, but I can think of no sound reason that would justify placing
a civil case entirely under seal, and placing a criminal case entirely under
seal would plainly violate various constitutional strictures. 45 There are
often, of course, very good reasons to place portions of the litigation record under seal, but to place the entire matter under seal removes the
case from the possibility of public scrutiny.
Placing a matter entirely under seal is the antithesis of judicial transparency, and it has two principal pernicious effects. First, it immunizes
the proceedings from the public scrutiny that is necessary to sustain the
judiciary's legitimacy. It is the place of the judiciary to interpret and apply
the law, and federal judges, by virtue of their independence, are free to
the greatest possible extent from the pressures of public opinion and political interference in carrying out this task. But it remains the duty of a
43. See id.
44. 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948).
45. It has been suggested that a worthy candidate for complete sealing is a
False Claims Act (FCA) case that is non-suited by a relator, with the government's
approval, before the government has determined whether to intervene and prosecute the case. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000). In these circumstances, a relator typically wishes to have the matter remain under seal, so that his or her employer will
not learn of the relator's action and perhaps retaliate in some way against the
relator. Courts should resist the request for continued sealing of the record as the
relator's proffered reason does not constitute good cause; the FCA prohibits such
retaliation and provides an effective remedy. See § 3730(h). In these circumstances, courts should decline the request for complete sealing of the case. At the
very least, courts should issue orders that disclose the existence of the FCA complaint and record the fact of the nonsuit.
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watchful public to evaluate the judiciary's actions, and to amend the law
when the judicial interpretation meets public disfavor. Obviously, the beneficent-even curative-effect of public scrutiny is impossible when judicial actions are hidden from view. And public scrutiny serves other
important social functions by demonstrating thatjustice is being done. As
ChiefJustice Burger put it:
[T]he open processes ofjustice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility,
and emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to
criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in
some form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they did regularly in
46
the activities of vigilante "committees" on our frontiers.
Removing judicial proceedings from public view deprives the public of the
vital opportunity to see whether justice is being done.
The second pernicious effect of sealing cases in their entirety is a corollary to the first: by depriving the public of the opportunity to see that
justice is being done, secret judicial proceedings increase the risk of actual
or perceived injustice. Experience shows that public scrutiny of judicial
activity is necessary to prevent abuses of judicial power. 47 In addition,
even if under seal trials do not in fact involve judicial abuses, secrecy encourages a perception of abuse, which in turn erodes public confidence in
judicial institutions and ultimately will lead to attacks on, and erosion of,
judicial independence.
Research conducted to date suggests that the number of cases placed
entirely under seal is likely vanishingly small. 4 8 Yet the principles that militate against total sealing of cases apply with similar force to any request to
seal court proceedings or records and with particular force where such
46. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
47. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
48. Thus, my district-the Eastern District of Virginia-reports that a search
discloses no completely sealed cases in this district. Yet, some instances of completely sealed cases clearly exist elsewhere. SeeJamie Satterfield, Monicer Fighting

Federal Court Ban, KNOXVILLE

NEWS-SENTINEL,

Mar. 7, 2008, at 1 (reporting under

seal proceedings barring Tennessee lawyer from practicing before federal courts).
Interestingly, two Seventh Circuit judges have recently expressed concern that
courts may be imprudently sealing entire cases. Then-ChiefJudge Joel Flaum, in a
June 13, 2006 letter to the chair of the Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure, expressed concem regarding the complete sealing of cases.
To the same effect, Judge Flaum's successor, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, in a
February 22, 2007 letter to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, reiterated Judge Flaum's concerns and proposed further inquiry
into the frequency of entirely sealed cases. In response, the Committee on the
Rules of Practice and Procedure established an Ad Hoc Committee to explore this
issue and consider whether an appropriate federal rule of procedure on sealing
should be promulgated. I serve on that Committee, which, with the able assistance
of the Federal Judicial Center, is undertaking a study to determine the extent of
the practice of sealing entire cases within the federal justice system.
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requests are cumulative. It is of vital importance, therefore, that courts
confronted with requests to seal records keep in mind the tension between
sealing court records and maintaining a transparent and just judiciary.
2. Second, documents should not be placed permanently under seal.
Permanent sealing is both pernicious and unnecessary. It is pernicious for
all the reasons already canvassed that counsel against secrecy in court proceedings, including the potential for this practice to conceal abuses by
judges or parties-indeed, even providing an incentive for such abuses.
Further, where the participants in certain court proceedings, including
the judge, know the proceedings will be permanently sealed from public
scrutiny, they may feel less restrained in their conduct, knowing that they
will not be held to account publicly for their actions.
Permanent sealing is as unnecessary as it is pernicious. As discussed
previously, courts have recognized relatively few interests that justify curtailing the public's First Amendment and common law rights of access.
Each of these interests is limited in its duration or applicability, and although the specific duration is often unknown at the time of sealing, no
legitimate interest warrants perpetual protection. Sealing of trade secrets
illustrates this point. A trade secret is entitled to protection only as long as
it remains a trade secret. 49 Once the information has entered the public
domain, the justification for sealing documents detailing that information
disappears.
In sum, the duration of a requested seal is no less important than its
scope. If records are to be placed under seal, the seal should continue
only as long as reasonably necessary in light of the reasons that originally
warranted sealing. Where, as may sometimes occur, the proper duration
of a seal cannot be accurately forecasted at the time of sealing, then transparency requires that a court periodically reevaluate the reasons for a seal
to determine whether the seal continues to be justified.
When a matter is placed under seal in the early phases of litigation, it
is prudent to reevaluate the seal as the litigation proceeds through later
stages, including, for instance, at the start of trial and following judgment.
And where sealing is appropriate even after litigation has concluded,
courts should incorporate into sealing orders a sunset provision requiring
the party or parties seeking the sealing to appear after some period of
time-perhaps three years or five, depending on the circumstances-to
establish that continuing the seal is appropriate. In short, every order sealing records should explicitly limit its own duration or, alternatively, require the party seeking protection to reappear and reestablish the
necessity of the seal. This simple mechanism will ensure that materials
requiring protection from the public's rights of access are maintained
under seal-but only as long as necessary, and no longer.
3. Finally, except where otherwise required by law, every decision to
place materials under seal should be reflected in the public record, typi49. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000).
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cally in two orders. First, an order should issue advising the public of the
nature of the documents or records sought to be sealed, and setting a
hearing date so members of the public may appear to object to the sealing.50 Second, if the hearing results in the sealing of any materials, the
court should issue a public order disclosing the fact that materials were
sealed, describing the nature of the sealed materials to the greatest extent
possible without compromising the seal and explaining the reasons justifying sealing-again to the extent possible without compromising the seal.
Issuing such an order serves important purposes. First, it requires that the
courts pay close attention to the merits of the sealing motion, rather than
simply accept a party's representations about the need for protection.
This ensures that only meritorious motions to seal are granted. Further,
such an order creates a public record that can immediately be scrutinized
and challenged by those who might have an interest in public access to the
sealed material.
Much has been said about sealing, and much remains to be said. 5 1
The modest suggestions-no complete sealing of cases, no permanent
sealing of materials and issuance of public sealing orders that describe
both the sealed material and the reasons for sealing-are intended to reflect and embody the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability outlined at the beginning of this Article. An empirical study
of existing sealing practices across the ninety-three districts would likely be
beneficial by revealing whether and to what degree court seals are used in
a manner contrary to the principles of judicial transparency discussed in
this Article. But with or without such a study, concern for judicial transparency and independence counsels caution whenever a seal request is
made.
50. See In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dor6, Settlement, Secrecy, andJudicialDiscretion: South
Carolina'sNew Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REv. 791 (2004);
Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed Settlement Agreements, 81 CHI.-KFNT L.
REv. 439 (2006); Daniel Lombard, Note, Top Secret: A ConstitutionalLook at the Procedural Problems Inherent in Sealing Civil Court Documents, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 1067
(2006).
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